FLORENCE HSIA v. FUNG PO YUK

CACV000001A/1973

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1 OF 1973

(On appeal from O.J. 1475 of 1972)

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BETWEEN
FLORENCE HSIA Plaintiff
(Appellant)
and
FUNG PO YUK Defendant
(Respondent)

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Coram: Huggins and McMullin, JJ.

Date of Judgment: 17th April 1973.

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JUDGMENT

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Huggins, J.:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council against a decision of this Court dismissing an appeal againstan assessment of damages for assault. Notice of the application has been served on the Respondent but the Respondent has not appearedupon the application.

2. Before us the Applicant has asked initially that this Court should hear further evidence. At the previous hearing she referred toa certificate which she said was in the possession of the police. It was a document which was not produced at the trial, which couldhave been produced at the trial and which we thought it was too late to produce upon appeal. She now asks us once more to see thisdocument. We cannot look at this document in this Court. We have given our decision and we have no jurisdiction to go into that matterfurther.

3. The only matter which is now before us is the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Under the Order in Council regulatingappeals to Her Majesty in Council from this Court there is an appeal as of right from a final judgment “where the matter in dispute… amounts to or is of the value of $50,000 or upwards, or where the appeal involves, directly or indirectly, some claim or questionto or respecting property or some civil right amounting to a value of $50,000 or upwards”. A claim for damages for assault wouldnormally be an unliquidated claim and it may well be that normally the Appellant would have been able to appeal as of right to HerMajesty in Council. However, she saw fit to limit her claim to $20,000 and that being so she does not come within para. (a) of art.2of the Order.

4. There is a discretion in this Court, therefore, to grant leave. We are satisfied that this is not a case where we ought to grantleave. The matter was gone into very fully before the judge and before this Court on the evidence which was adduced before the Court.As we indicated at the hearing on 15th March we think that this was a grossly inflated claim and that under the circumstances theAppellant could not have obtained damages amounting to anything approaching $20,000 or even anything approaching $400 or $500, and,that being so, in our view this application is without merit and must be dismissed. There is no question involved in the appeal which,by reason of its great general or public importance, ought to be submitted to Her Majesty in Council for decision.

17th April 1973.

Representation: